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Learning from the past, preparing for the future 1 
by Mie Augier & Maj Sean F.X. Barrett 
e n:cendy wrote abom 
the intclleccual renais -
sance inspirc:d by the 
29th Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, Gen Al frc:d M. Gray, 
and the relevance of mam:uvcr warfare 
ideas today. (See "People: First," 1'v!CG, 
Jun 19.) This article intends to explicate 
some themes regarding the chinking 
and decision making under uncertainty 
alluded to in our earlier article, as well 
as their usefulness given the trends in 
the current (and likely future) strategic 
operating environment. 
Fl11!FM I, t'(larfighti11g states, 
In an environment of friction, uncer -
raimy, and fluidity, war gravitates OJt• 
urallr toward disorder -· le is precisely 
this narural disorder which creates the 
conditions ripe for exploitation by an 
opportunistic will.2 
Early critics of maneuver warfare, how-
ever, argued that maneuver warfare did 
not give enemy commanders enough 
credit . After all, 
ir should not be assumed that enemy 
commanders will lose control of the 
siruation and their forces disintegrate 
when fuccd with rapidly changing si1u-
acions. 3 
Additionally, are we ro assume our Ma-
rine commanders will somehow remain 
unaffected by the same conditions? 
Enemy forces have proven throughout 
history that they will fight on in spite 
of" a disastrous logistics and command 
and control situacion."4 
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We want ta open a conversation about teaching critical and strategic thinking. (Photo by tCpl 
Jamin Powell} 
We acknowledge chat such assump -
tions are not altogether valid and aim 
to address these concerns by placing 
maneuver warfare philosophy within 
the larger literature on learning and 
problem solving under ambiguity in 
order to provide some recommenda -
tions-nested within both established 
educational curricula and Marine Corps 
history-for facilitating interdisciplin -
ary problem solving and re-cultivating 
this capability in our Marines. 
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In this article, we analvze the n:1ture 
of thinking and "thinking about think -
ing," but we do not discuss in detail the 
processes and pitfalls for criti cal and 
strategic thinking. Rather , we hope to 
extend the com·ersation about teach-
ing critical and strategic thinking and 
to nudge our [ndustrial Age teaching 
and learning mindset not just to the 
[nformation Age, but rather one step 
further to the Judgment Age.' 
An important point to keep in mind 
regarding learning (and approa ches to 
learning) is that education aiming to 
help nurture critical and strategic think-
ing has both cognitive (i.e., knowledge) 
and attitudinal (i.e., instinctual/affec-
tive) aspects; neither are automatic. 
However, while cognitive skills for 
anal yzing and understanding can be 
taught through concepts, heuristics, and 
methods, attitudinal aspects are more 
difficult to teach but ~till important and 
must be cultivated through mentorinr, 
and fostering curios icy and judgment . ' 
Thankfully, there are important les-
sons from the Marine Corps' own his-
tory (and the institution's emphasis on 
education for judgment) chat might be 
useful to re-invigorate che education of 
future thinkers . 
Ill-structured Problems and Learning 
and Problem Solving Under Ambiguity 
Any informed discussion of how to 
impro,·e thinking, learning, and educa-
tion should be based on undemanding 
the nature and process of human think-
ing and learning , rhe types of decisions 
humans make, and how we can improve 
decision making. 8 A better understand -
ing of such fundamentals of thinking 
and decision-making processes will 
help us ro improve current and future 
practices, as well as help us learn from 
what has nor worked well so that we 
can avoid simply becoming better in 
irrelevant areas. 
Building on and integrating some 
ideas from Herbert Simon, Gen Gray, 
LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, and others, we 
argue that most decision making is best 
viewed as caking place under conditions 
of bounded rationality, ambiguity, and 
when confronted with varying degrees 
of ill-structured problems - a key ele-
ment of the current and future strategic 
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For those placing unbri-
dled faith in technology, 
war is a predictable, if 
disorderly, phenomenon, 
defeat a matter of simple 
cost/benefit analysis, and 
the effectiveness of any 
military capability a fi-
nite calculus of targets 
destroyed and casualties 
inflicted. History paints 
a very different picture. 
Real war is an inherently 
uncertain enterprise in 
which chance, friction, 
and the limitations of the 
human mind under stress 
profoundly limit our abil· 
ity to predict outcomes? 
environment. In particular , Van Riper's 
distinction between analytical, intuitive, 
and systemic decision making is an in-
structive lens through which to view che 
usefulness of our teaching and learning 
approaches as well as the different types 
of problems for which they are useful.9 
Analytic decision making. Some con-
ceptions of decision making falling into 
this category include rational choice the-
ory, (most of) game theory, and systems 
analysis . These are useful frameworks 
to describe some decisions as long as the 
conditions and assumptions upon which 
they are built are valid, there is only a 
litclc unccrrainry (quantifiable risk), and 
the problem at hand is linear and rela-
tively well-structured. Systems analysis 
in particular has been a major analytic 
framework for decades of DOD decision 
making. Despite ics analytical elegance 
and simplicity, models used co capture 
analytic decision making are rarely use-
ful in the domain of human activity, 
including war. 10 The early fathers of 
systems analysis themselves were aware 
of the limitations of their perspective, 
~-- - - ·--, 
. - -. . - - .. -- ..., 
emphasizing the need to understand 
these limitations as well as the impor-
tance of not suppressing judgment in che 
name of analysis. 11 However, many are 
still often quite eager co understand che 
world through analytical models even at 
the expense of realism and underscand-
ing.12 Van Riper appeals instead to chc 
use of two other perspecch·es of decision 
making, which are applicable co prob-
lems that are neither linear nor simple 
and emphasize uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and the limits of human rationality. 
Intuitive decision making. As Van Rip-
er, Simon, and ochers have noted, most 
people do not chink and make decisions 
in terms of numbers. [nscead, we use pat-
tern recognition and intuition enabled 
by mental or cogniti, ·e models. This is 
especially true with more ill-structured 
problems, when more uncerraincr is 
present, and when having to make de-
cisions with mam· unknown variables . 
We make intuici~·e decisions when we 
face situations under uncertainty . We 
recognize things as if part of a pattern or 
something we have seen (or read about) 
before; thus we convince ourscl\'c:s that 
we do nor need co think about it. 
Systemic decision making. The most 
difficult form of decision making is 
when confronted with wicked prob-
lems and when you do not recognize 
patterns: no shared mental models can 
be relied upon. For chese instances, Van 
Riper appeals co developing an under-
standing of the logic and drivers of the 
situation and using holistic , interdisci-
plinary, and empirically dri\'en problem 
solving. John Boyd's emphasis on chink-
ing, analogies , and synthesis is a useful 
approach for such decision making. 
Van Riper's (and Simon's) approach 
co decision making involves both art 
and science. However, gi\'en the com-
plexitr of che security environment, 
understanding and teaching the "art " 
aspc:cts are paramount: 
The arc of war and the science of war 
are not coequal. The art of war is 
clearly the most important. It's science 
in support of the art. Any time that 
science leads in your ability to think 
about and make war, I bdieve you're 
ht-aded down a dangerous path. The 
art is the thinking. It is the imcllcctual 
underpinnings of war.13 
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Education is the acquisi-
tion of the art of the utili-
za#on of knowledge. This 
is an art very difficult to 
impart. Whenever a text-
book is written of real 
educational worth, you 
may be quite certain that 
some reviewer will say 
that it will be difficult to 
teach from it. Of course it 
will be difficult to teach 
from it. If it were easy, the 
book ought o be burned,· 
for it cannot be educa-
tion.14 
Fortunatdy, Marines have acknowl-
edged this for quite a while, and rhe 
emphasis on systemic and intuitive 
decision making is built into core or-
ganizational documents and Gen Gray's 
vision for Marine Corps PME. Thus, re-
membering his emphasis in the context 
of current PME challenges, including 
what teaching methodologies are most 
appropriate, will be useful. 
Learning and Thinking in the Marin e 
Corps and Beyond 
As mentioned in our previous article, 
Gen Gray sought to institutionalize the 
intellectual renaissance in the Marine 
Corps and key to that was the founding 
of Marine Corps University (MCU). 
Fundamentally, he wanted to ensure his 
Marines were as mentally ready to fight 
as they were physically. This required 
more than Marines simply memorizing 
facts or becoming academic historians; 
instead, education was intended to serve 
as a vehicle for sharpening judgment 
and warfighting capabilities : 
74 
Through education we can equip our-
sdvcs to make sound military judg-
ments even in chaotic and uncertain 
sicuadons. The ability to make clear 
and swift judgments, amidst chaos, is 
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Marines must study the profession of arms, not only in school, but through self-study. (Photo 
by Sgt Olivia Ortiz./ 
what set~ che warrior apart intellectu-
ally. Though practice in the field and 
in w:irgamcs is important to improving 
militar y ju<lgment, ics Jcvclopmcnt 
remains anchored co education about 
war.15 
This emphasis on education was reiter-
ated in FMFM I, which emphasized ev-
ery Marine 's n:sponsibility to study the 
profession of arms on his own, putting 
self-study on par with physical train-
ing: "Self-study in the art and science 
of war is at least equal in importance 
and should receive at lease equal time 
to maintaining physical condition." 16 
As Commandant, Gen Gray or• 
dered his Marines to read and publish 
a manual, Book on BookI, to introduce 
and explain the professional reading 
program he would institutionalize as 
the Comm:mdanc's Reading List. Col 
Mike Wyly, who wrote Section 1, noted 
that professional reading itself was nor 
rhe end product desired; thinking and 
actions on the battlefield arc. However, 
reading, thinking about what you read, 
and internalizing by relating it in real 
ways to one's job are necessary prepara-
tory actions .17 Wyly explains the les• 
sons , ranging from the most tacti cal 
to the most strategic levels, one can 
learn from reading in depth about a 
single battle and how chey can be ap-
plied co other battles . Military literacy 
only improves by reading about multiple 
battles . 18 
This learning emphasis is similar 
to che case method, which first rose to 
prominence at Harvard Law School in 
the late 1800s and at Harvard Busi-
ness School in the early 1900s. 19 The 
DOD could further incorporate the case 
method - in lieu of more enabling and 
terminal learning objectives- imo PME 
institutions to foster critical thinking 
and judgment. According to Kenneth 
Andrews' classic definition, a case is 
a carefully written description of an 
actual situation in business which pro-
vokes in the reader the need co ded de 
what is going on, what the situation 
really is, or what the problems arc-
and what can and should be done. 20 
The case method balances the tension 
between experiential and academic 
knowledge, placing less emphasis on 
che abstract knowledge against which 
Gen Gray warned and more on how to 
recognize and react in concrete situa -
tions . While critics warn that too heavy 
an emphasis on the case method might 
detra ct from systematic knowledge and 
analytical skills and argue chat cases 
can be overly simplistic, che principal 
claim of proponents is chat rhe case 
method develops students' problem-
solving skills for when they are later 
confronted with ill-structured problems 
in che real world, and it leverages the 
heterogeneity of the students co foster 
interdisciplinary problem -solving. 21 
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Gen Gray recognized and emphasized 
the merits of this form of instruction 
and took steps toward emphasizing both 
chinking and judgment in exercises as 
well as key institutional documents to 
hdp educ~te for rhe future. 22 
This form of instruction has a his-
tory in Marine Corps PME institu-
tions chat e\·en predated che founding 
of MCU and is rooted in che initial 
devdopmem of maneuver warfare phi-
losophy. When Col Wyly took over as 
Head of Tactics at Amphibious War-
fare School for the 1979- 80 academi c 
war , he felt the curriculum (that he 
had studied himself while a student 
at Amphibiou s \X'arfare School) was 
lacking in history and intdlectual rigor. 
Dissatisfied with Marine Corps doc-
trine and educational curricula, \V\'h-
turned to rhe ideas of John Boyd dnd 
resolved to deemphasize instruction on 
manuals and doctrine , which he fdt 
became ends in themselves. 23 Wyly 
invited Bord to speak during char 
school year, and he incorporated his-
Other important bureaucracic ten-
dencies chat Gen Gray warned against 
is the desire to measure - ostensiblr 
"progress"- and create standard pro -
cesses, both of which oftentimes are the 
enemy of cricical chinking and create 
burdensome requirements char under -
mine a i\.farine's motivation to learn. 26 
In the forward for Book on Books, he 
recognized chat individuals and units 
could use different methods for execut• 
i ng his order co read. This theme of de-
centralized implementation continued 
throughout the text and is consistent 
with mission-type orders. In explaining 
what to read, \Vyly asserted, ~Marines 
should pick thdr books according to 
their needs."~- The books referenced 
were simply meant to be "seed corn ... 
to stimulate interests in reading about 
the profession." 18 Implementing the 
program would be "left up to the dis-
cretion and initiative of commanders 
and individuals.'' 29 In marked contrast 
10 today's mounting administrative and 
training requirements, Wrly informed 
Furthermore, ven the best designed institutional ed-
ucational structures can only do so much ... 
mrical battle: studies and exercises that 
required students co make decisions. 
Wyly also eliminated prescribed solu-
tions that instructors had previously 
relied on during these exercises and 
even deviated from established norms 
and curricula by taking his students 
10 the field for tactical exercises with-
out rroops.24 His ability to transform 
the curriculum was made possible by 
the high degree of freedom his chain 
of command afforded him. However, 
when his superiors changed, Wyly was 
ultimately reassigned to a mundane 
staff position because his superiors 
wanted to return to the old attrition 
docrrinc. 2; This episode is instructive 
in that it highlights the bureaucratic 
tendency to resist change and empha-
sizes the need to build and maintain a 
broad base of support chat can foster 
change from the bottom up, a tactic 
char Gen Gray presciently employed. 
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readers, uDo not anticipate a reporting 
process, or a centralized requirement for 
written exams, designed co assure chat 
Marines are rcading."30 
The: perils of relying on centralized 
exams and requirements too heavily, as 
wdl as the importance of active learn-
ing (e.g., cases), should inform current 
educational initiatin:s. In discussing the: 
aims of education, Alfred North White-
head warns: 
In education, as elsewhere, the broad 
primrose path is represented by a book 
or a set oflectures whit:h will practical-
ly enable the student to learn br heart 
all the questions likelr to be asked at 
the next external cxamination,3 1 
While acknowledging that "such ex-
aminations have their use in testing 
slackness," Whitehead contended chat 
the uniform central examination 
- - . - - ... -· - - -~ 
kills the best part of our culture:. \'{' hen 
you analyse in the light of experience: 
the central task of education , \ 'OU find 
chat its successful accomplish~ent de-
pends on a delicate adjustment of many 
variable factors . The reason is that we 
arc dealing with human minds , and 
not with dead matter. The evocation 
of curiosity, ofjudgmcnc , of the power 
of mastering a complicated tangle of 
circumstances ... all these powers arc 
not to be imparted by a set rule em-
bodied in one schcdulr.: of examination 
subjccts. 32 
Leaders should imple-
ment the program in such 
a way that Marines are 
encouraged and moti-
vated to read and do not 
view professional read-
ing as a troublesome re-
quirement.33 
Thus, fostering a culture that inspires 
Marines co "realize [their] own potential 
in order ro better fulfill [their] profes-
sional calling" is a culcure consistent 
with Grav's vision for education as well 
as earlier 'foundational discussions con-
cerning the history and philosophy of 
education, rhe emphasis on interdisci -
plinary reading and learning, and the 
importance of chinking and understand * 
ing (i.e., not just accumulating facts). 
Implications for PME 
As senior leaders increasingly call for 
improving the education of critical and 
strategic chinking in our PME institu -
cions,34 a new doctrinal philosophy for 
learning might find inspiration from in-
tegrating rhe philosophies of Whitehead 
and Gray, as well as from Simon and 
Van Riper's emphasis on human think-
ing and problem-solving. The story of 
Gen Gray's emphasis on education, 
chinking, and judgment - and their 
significance to rhe maneuver warfare 
movement-is important to more than 
the story of a particular period of Ma-
rine Corps history. Rather, it provides 
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an intelleccual framework for dealing 
with che type of ill-structured, complex 
problems that Simon, Van Riper, and 
others emphasize and lays che necessary 
groundwork coward providing the intel-
lectual and institutional structure (e.g., 
MCU) to support an enduring emphasis 
on teaching thinking and judgment. 
However, implicit in both Whitehead 
and Grar's philosophies is che difficulty 
in measuring educational advancements 
and benefits as well as their concern that 
accempcs to do so only serve to suffocate 
chinking. Unfortunately, the tendency 
oflarge organizations, including those 
that house PME, is to evolve in ways 
chat suppress individual creativity, 
chinking, and ocher "disruptive" forces 
e\·cn though chey are the very founda-
~i.on for s:racegic and critical thinking. 
I hus, senior leaders of PME institutions 
and military organizations must always 
s~ek co counter the forces stifling chink-
ing, including internal policies and pro-
cesses chat seem designed mostly never 
to change. 
Furthermore, even the best designc:d 
institutional educational structures can 
only do so much if the students or Ma-
rines are not inspired with a curiosity to 
explore, discover, think, and learn. The 
philosophies of Gray and Whitehead 
chus underscore creating a "culture of 
curiosity" as the first mover to improv-
ing education, as well as che centrality of 
leadership and mencorship to learning 
and thinking. While a wider perspective 
will probably shed some light on how 
the architectures of larger organizational 
structures might need co be reformed 
in order co supporr, not stifle, the edu-
cation of strategists and thinkers, first 
developing certain attitudes (rather than 
functional knowledge and content) and 
ways of chinking in our Marines can 
prove to be an integrating force in the 
development of future stracegic leaders. 
Thankfully, the Marine Corps has a 
rich history of empowering lower-level 
leaders with mission-type orders that 
i, can leverage to further embrace and 
enhance education and ward off the 
calcification and status quo (and other) 
biases inherent in large organizations. 
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